Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Corporation Held Not Collapsible Where View to Sell Arose After Construction Completed by Kearse, Amalya L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 5 
1961 
Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Corporation Held Not Collapsible 
Where View to Sell Arose After Construction Completed 
Amalya L. Kearse 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Construction Law Commons, Taxation-Federal 
Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Amalya L. Kearse, Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Corporation Held Not Collapsible Where View to Sell 
Arose After Construction Completed, 59 MICH. L. REV. 802 (1961). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss5/10 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
802 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-CORPORATION HELD NOT COLLAPSIBLE 
WHERE Vmw To SELL AROSE AFTER CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED-Petitioners 
had formed a corporation for the purpose of building and operating a 
housing project. After the construction was completed and most of the 
apartments rented, small cracks were discovered in the buildings. Without 
soliciting engineering or other technical opinion, petitioners sold their 
stock in the corporation. The Tax Court1 upheld respondent-commis-
sioner's taxing the profit from the sale of stock as ordinary income rather 
than capital gain, on the theory that the corporation was "collapsible" un-
der section 117 (m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.2 On appeal, held, 
reversed. Since the view to the sale of stock did not exist before construction 
was completed, the corporation was not within the contemplation of section 
117 (m). Jacobson v. Comm'r, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960). 
Section 117 (m), now section 341 of the 1954 Code, provides that gains 
from the sale of stock of a collapsible corporation be taxed as ordinary in-
come. It defines a collapsible corporation as one "formed or availed of 
principally for the manufacture, construction, or production of property ... 
with a view to •.. the sale of stock by its shareholders ... prior to a real-
ization by the corporation . . . of a substantial part of the net income to 
be derived from such property. . . ."3 The cases and Treasury regulations 
1 Lewis S. Jacobson, 32 T.C. 893 (1959). 
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m), added by ch. 994, § 212, 64 Stat. 934 (1950) (now 
INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 341). 
3 (Emphasis added.) Ibid. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m}(3) (C) (now 
essentially INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (3)): "this subsection shall not apply to gain 
realized after the expiration of three years following the completion of such manufacture, 
construction, or production." 
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construing the section 117 (m) "view" requirement agree that a corporation 
can be collapsible even though the view to the sale of stock was not the sole 
or principal reason for which the corporation was "formed or availed of,"4 
and have been concerned primarily with the time when the view to sell 
must have arisen or existed. It must initially be recognized that in fact 
there must necessarily exist, if only immediately prior to the actual sale, a 
view to sell in every case where stock has been sold. The question would 
then be whether application of section 117 (m) requires more than such a 
belated "view."11 
In the principal case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held 
that section 117 (m) requires for collapsibility the temp0ral conjunction of 
construction, which is one of the named corporate purposes of section 
117 (m), and the view to the sale of stock. The Court looked primarily to 
the language of section 117 (m) and reasoned that the view with which the 
property was constructed must necessarily be a view held at the time of the 
construction. This interpretation appears to be reasonable in light of the 
statutory language and finds support in the Treasury regulations, which 
say that a corporation should not be deemed collapsible if the sale of stock 
is attributable solely to circumstances not reasonably foreseeable before 
construction was completed.6 On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals 
for the Second and Fourth Circuits, in Glickman v. Comm'rt and Burge 
v. Comm'r,s respectively, use what is essentially an objective test.9 They 
have held that a corporation can be classified as collapsible if the view to 
the sale of stock existed at any time during the life of the corporation.10 
This result is achieved by the somewhat strained reasoning that a corpora-
4 See Weil v. Comm'r, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 765 
(4th Cir. 1958) (dictum); Glickman v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958) (dictum); R. A. 
Bryan, 32 T.C. 104 (1959) (dictum); Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.II7-II (b) (1953). It has also been 
argued that had Congress intended that the view to sell be a principal objective, it would 
have used the phrase with "the" view rather than with "a" view. MacLean, Collapsible 
Corporations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 55, 58-60 (1953). 
Ii "Section 341 [of INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954-which was formerly § II7 (m) of Int. Rev. 
Code of 1939] is a patchwork of interlaced problems of interpretation. For recurring ob-
scurities of meaning it is hard to surpass. Neither well conceived nor well drafted, it is 
replete with vague concepts and obscure or faulty phraseology." DeWind & Anthoine, 
Collapsible Corporations, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 475, 534 (1956). 
6 Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.II7-ll (b) (1953). Emphasis must be placed on "solely" for the 
Treasury regulations observe that the view can exist during construction if there was then 
recognized even a conditional possibility of sale. This has been criticized as giving the 
"view" an unreasonably weak meaning. See MacLean, supra note 4, at 60. 
7 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958). 
B 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). 
9 The objective test is whether when the stock was sold, the corporation held recently 
constructed property. This reasoning ignores the subjective criterion which distinguishes 
between bona fide short-lived corporations and sham corporations. 
10 All of these cases involve essentially the same fact situation: taxpayers form a closely-
held corporation, get an FHA loan, and build an apartment house, or housing project. 
Afte: construction is completed, but before a "substantial part" of the rental moneys are 
rec~1ved: !3"P~yers sell the stock, or liquidate the corporation, realizing a large profit on 
their or1gmal mvestments. Thus there does not appear to be any factual basis for reconcil-
ing the conflict among the circuits. 
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tion is collapsible if it is "availed of" for the proscribed sale of stock.11 In 
effect these courts read into section 117 (m) the proscribed sale of stock as 
one of the purposes for which a corporation may be availed of under section 
117 (m).12 Thus they accept the most belated view possible as satisfying 
section 117 (m) and negate any significance which Congress might have in-
tended to attach to the "view'' requirement. The courts in Burge and 
Glickman were persuaded to this interpretation by considerations of the 
problems which led Congress to enact section 117 (m).13 Subsection (m) was 
added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in 195014 to prevent the forma-
tion or use of short-lived corporations in isolated ventures for the purpose 
of lessening tax liability by converting what was essentially ordinary income 
into long-term capital gain.15 From these problems, the courts in Burge and 
Glickman have drawn their inference that Congress intended to preclude 
the enjoyment of capital treatment by means of any short-lived corporation 
which engaged in any of section 117 (m)'s enumerated activities.1 6 In each 
of the pre-enactment cases confronting Congress, the taxpayers admittedly 
sought from the outset to avoid ordinary treatment; accordingly the com-
peting inference could reasonably be drawn that Congress intended section 
117 (m) to apply only to those whose formation or use of corporations was 
influenced by "a view to the sale of stock." Since this more restrictive in-
terpretation of the pre-enactment materials is reasonable and is consonant 
with the language of the statute, reference to these pre-enactment materials 
does not dissolve the ambiguity found in the statute by the courts in Burge 
and Glickman. 
The rule laid down by Burge and Glickman does have the effect of 
plugging what those courts would otherwise have considered a loophole. 
11E.g., Glickman v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 111: "Since the corporation may at any 
time during its corporate life be 'availed of' for the proscribed purpose, •.• it seems sur-
prising that the Regulations have adopted a narrower interpretation of the statute, and 
require the requisite view to exist 'during the construction •• .' or to be 'attributable' to 
'circumstances which reasonably could be anticipated by the time of such ••. construction.' 
We are disposed to disagree with so narrow an interpretation .•• .'' There is little, if any, 
justification for omitting the words "manufacture, construction, or production" as modifiers 
of "formed or availed of.'' "How can one 'construct property with a view to a distribution' 
if the 'view' arose after the property was constructed? If the draftsmen truly intended to 
apply section 341 based on the taxpayer's intentions on the sale or liquidation date, they 
could easily have said so." Comment, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 855, 865 (1960). 
12 See, e.g., Burge v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 768. 
13 Such ambiguity as there is in this part of the statute seems hardly great enough to 
warrant reference to pre-enactment materials. 
14 Added by ch. 994, § 212, 64 Stat. 906 (1950). 
15 In the movie and construction industries, the practice had arisen of forming a cor-
poration to make a movie or build a building; the actors and directors, or the contractors, 
would take stock instead of salaries. When the production or construction was completed, 
the stock in the corporation would be sold before box office or rental moneys were received. 
The profit was thus taxable as capital gain rather than ordinary income. For further dis-
cussion, see STANLEY &: K!LcULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Supp. 1950, at 24-25); De-
Wind &: Anthoine, supra note 5. 
16 See Burge v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 769; Glickman v. Comm'r, supra note 4, at 110. 
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While the decision in the principal case closes only a smaller loophole, it 
is probably the one which Congress sought to close. In fathoming con-
gressional intent, the whole difficulty stems from the question of whether 
to hinge capital treatment on the motive or on the consequences of the 
taxpayer's acts. The Burge-Glickman rule, while it does not thwart at least 
the original reason for limiting tax on capital gains,17 does disregard what 
seems to be a congressional determination that the taxpayer's motive is an 
essential consideration in determining collapsibility. Therefore, although 
the Burge-Glickman rule is easier to administer, since it does not require 
judicial inquiry into the existence of a subjective factor, it is a less reason-
able conclusion to draw. The rule in the principal case is the more justi-
fiable interpretation, recognizing as it does the requirement of subjective 
intent which has been written into the statute. It is to be presumed that 
Congress did not require a "view" without intending some significance. 
Amalya L. Kearse 
17The limitation of taxation on income defined as capital gains was originally enacted, 
in part, because such income may have accrued over a period of several years and it would 
be "inequitable to tax [it] ••• at progressive rates in the particular year in which [it is] 
•.• realized." MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 115 (rev. ed. 1945). However, the possibility of 
this unfairness is much diminished in the case of a corporation collapsible by either in-
terpretation of the statute, since the gains will probably have accrued in less than three 
years. See note 3 supra. 
